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A UNITED KINGDOM PERSPECTIVE ON
THE PROPOSED HAGUE
JUDGMENTS CONVENTION
Paul R. Beaumont*
I. BACKGROUND TO THE UK INVOLVEMENT IN THE HAGUE
JUDGMENTS CONVENTION NEGOTIATIONS
British involvement in the Hague Judgments Convention
project was early and supportive. Following the U.S. proposal
of 5 May 1992, the United Kingdom (UK) supported the deci-
sion of the Special Commission on General Affairs and Policy
of the Conference which met from 1 to 4 June 1992, to estab-
lish a working group to examine the proposal. Indeed the UK
sent two members to the Working Group of thirteen people.
The UK members, appropriately, were drawn from England
and Scotland, John Watherston of the Lord Chancellor's De-
partment and Peter Beaton of Scottish Courts Administration.
The appropriateness of involving a Scottish viewpoint within
the UK delegation stems from the separate legal system in
Scotland which has greater historical roots in the civil law
than English law but, particularly since the union with Eng-
land of 1707, has been significantly influenced by the common
law. It has been suggested that Scotland may act as a "bridge"
between the two main juridical groups represented in the
Hague negotiations, i.e., the Anglo-American common law and
the civil law.' It may be significant that one of the most diffi-
cult issues in the Hague negotiations is resolving how to deal
with conflicts of jurisdiction. The civil law doctrine of lis pen-
dens is simple and certain but rather arbitrary. The Anglo-
* Professor of European Union and Private International Law, University of
Aberdeen. Member of the United Kingdom (UK) Advisory Committee for the
Hague Judgments Convention and a member of the UK delegation at the Hague
for the Special Commission considering the proposed Judgments Convention in
June 1996, June 1997 and March 1998. The views expressed in this paper are
personal and are not to be taken as reflecting the views of the UK Government or
the UK Advisory Committee.
1. See Letter from Lord Mackay of Drumadoon, Lord Advocate, to Paul R.
Beaumont (Apr. 18, 1997) (on file with author) (appointing present writer to the
UK Advisory Committee).
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American doctrine of forum non conveniens is complicated and
discretionary but does allow for appropriate results. The prob-
lem with the juxtaposition just enunciated is that it is essen-
tially false, not only because it is too simplistic but also be-
cause it ignores the historical reality. Forum non conveniens is
a doctrine of Scottish private international law which can be
traced back to before the union with England and developed
into its modern form in the nineteenth century. It is the prod-
uct of a mixed legal system which has been exported to the
United States, England and other common law countries in the
twentieth century. It was not introduced in Scotland to deal
with "abuses of personal service of process carried out on the
territory of the forum"2 because Scotland never had such a
basis of jurisdiction. This, unfortunately, is an example of the
Hague Permanent Bureau transposing an English problem into
a Scottish context and assuming that the Scottish doctrine was
devised to deal with the English problem. A civilian mind as-
sumes that the need to have discretion to decline to exercise
jurisdiction must be because the country has over broad, or
exorbitant, rules of jurisdiction. However, it may simply be the
case that it is impossible to devise rules of jurisdiction which
will always lead to an appropriate court hearing the case. Even
the archetypically fair jurisdiction rule, the domicile of the
defendant, the general rule of jurisdiction in the Brussels3 and
Lugano Conventions,4 can lead to an inappropriate forum.5 If
the Hague Convention is to be a success then stereotypical
2. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, NOTE ON THE QUESTION OF
"FORUM NON CONVENIENS" IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF A DOUBLE CONVENTION ON
JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF DECISIONS 2 (Prel. Doc. No. 3,
1996) [hereinafter FORUM NON CONVENIENS NOTE]. The Note cites the first edition
of A. E. ANTON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967) as authority for the state-
ment but does not give a page reference. It refers the reader "for details" to the
document submitted by the UK in Annex D. See FORUM NON CONVENIENS NOTE,
supra, at 2. Yet an analysis of that document and of the first edition of Anten's
book will provide no support for the proposition of the Permanent Bureau.
3. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels
Convention] (for the consolidated, current text of this convention see 1990 O.J. (C
189) 2, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1413).
4. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
620 [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
5. See In re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd. (No. 2), [1991] 4 All. E.R. 348 (Eng.
C.A. 1990).
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assumptions will have to be abandoned in the quest for a way
of resolving conflicts of jurisdiction. At least in Scotland we are
used to examining issues on their merits without too many
legal preconceptions.
My own involvement with the proposed Hague Judgments
Convention began with the UK Government asking me to pre-
pare a paper on forum non conveniens in the UK for presenta-
tion to the meeting of the special commission in June 1996.6
Professor Trevor Hartley of the London School of Economics
was also commissioned by the UK Government to prepare a
paper on punitive or excessive damages for the same special
commission.7 We were both invited to attend the special com-
mission in June 1996 as part of the UK delegation. This may
be a welcome sign of greater use being made of academic law-
yers within the UK delegation at the Hague Conference. After
the great years of Professors Anton and Graveson from the
1960s to the early 1980s, when UK academic lawyers played a
prominent part in the creation of new Hague Conventions,
quite a few Conventions were negotiated without a UK aca-
demic delegate and their involvement may have been in danger
of becoming exceptional.8 The U.S. delegation has an admira-
ble blend of legal civil servants, experienced practitioners and
academics which could usefully be followed by other Member
States.
Of course the constraints of cost and time may prevent
some Member States from having a large mixed delegation.
However, there is nothing to prevent Member States from
establishing such a mixture in domestic advisory committees.
Indeed this is what has happened in the UK The Advisory
Committee met for the first time on 15 May 1997. It was
chaired by an English judge, Lord Saville, and its membership
was comprised of one Scottish judge, Lord Penrose, one Eng-
6. See FORUM NON CONVENIENS NOTE, supra note 2, Annex D.
7. See generally HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, NOTE ON THE
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF DECISIONS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF A DOUBLE
CONVENTION WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO FOREIGN JUDGMENTS AWARDING PUNITIVE
OR EXCESSIVE DAMAGES Annex D (Prel. Doc. No. 4, 1996). In 1998, Professor
Hartley was added to the membership of the UK Advisory Committee.
8. For example, Professor David Hayton in the Convention on the Law Appli-
cable to Trusts and on Their Recognition, done July 1, 1985 (visited Jan. 19, 1998)
<httpl/www.minbuza.nl/Vrdragen/verdr3o.html>.
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lish academic, Dr. Peter North of Oxford University, and one
English solicitor QC of great academic ability, Lawrence Col-
lins, two English barristers, David Lloyd Jones and Toby Lan-
dau, two English civil servants, John Burnett of the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry and John Watherston of the Lord
Chancellor's Department, one Scottish civil servant, Peter
Beaton of Scottish Courts Administration, and one Scottish
academic, the current writer. Oliver Parker of the Lord
Chancellor's Department is the secretary to the committee. The
Advisory Committee met for a second time on 10 June 1997 to
advise the delegation to the special commission in June 1997
and to advise the Government in drawing up the UK negotiat-
ing position. The delegation in June 1997 was drawn from the
membership of the Committee and comprised John Watherston
(head), Peter Beaton and the present writer. The committee
did not engage in widespread consultation at this early stage of
the negotiations, though that is planned for 1998, but it did
request views from the Association of British Insurers and the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI). The reason for sound-
ing out these groups so early in the process was the fact that
one of the causes of the bilateral treaty between the UK and
the United States of the 1970s running aground was the oppo-
sition of British industry and insurers. The concerns related to
the risk of having to recognise U.S. judgments which, in their
view, awarded excessive damages against British companies or
insurers.'
9. The committee is privileged to have as a member Sir Peter North who
was involved in the draft bilateral treaty between the United States and UK. For
his original analysis see P.M. North, The Draft U.K/U.S. Judgments Convention:
A British Viewpoint, 1 NW. J. INT L. & Bus. 219, 219-39 (1979), and for an
updated version see PETER NORTH, ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 201-23
(1993). North's book summarizes the criticisms of British industry and commerce.
See id. at 213-14. The hostile reaction in the 1970s to the draft Convention was
such that the then Labour Government had discussions with the insurance indus-
try and others and renegotiated the Convention. See Hansard, H.C. Official Report
952:321 (1978). In March 1979 the results of that renegotiation were put out to
consultation in the UK by the Lord Chancellor's Department. See LORD
CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, PROPOSED CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED KING-
DOM AND THE UNITED STATES FOR THE RECIPROCAL RECOGNITION AND ENFORCE-
MENT OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL MATIERS (1979). In June 1980, the new Conserva-
tive Lord Chancellor, making a statement in the House of Lords on the outcome
of the consultation, said: "A substantial proportion of the bodies which commented
on the Consultative Paper felt that a Convention might be harmful in view of the
very high damages awarded by American juries, especially in personal injury and
[Vol. XXIV:1
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The June 1997 Position Paper of the Association of British
Insurers on the Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Judgments" gives the Association's
preliminary views and the CBI associated itself with the April
1996 Position Paper entitled, "World-wide Convention on Juris-
diction, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments" of the
Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe
(UNICE). As the former is a document submitted to Govern-
ment in confidence, one has to be careful about using it as a
source. The impression from the two sources is that although
the concerns of the 1970s are still present, such as the poten-
tial for excessive damages being awarded and the unpredict-
ability of juries, there is a greater willingness to try to achieve
a solution to these problems. British industry and insurers
may be more tempted by the Hague Convention negotiations
than they were by the bilateral negotiations with the United
States of the 1970s because it holds out the prospect of solving
some of their concerns about U.S. jurisdiction at the source. A
traditional recognition and enforcement convention, a single
convention, cannot eliminate exorbitant jurisdictional bases.
Thus, in the 1970s UK industry saw that the single convention
on offer did not reduce their exposure to exorbitant bases of
jurisdiction in the United States. Therefore, it could only be of
assistance to those companies who had very few assets in the
United States and could not have awards enforced against
them there. However, if the Hague manages to agree on a
double or mixed convention then it will eliminate exorbitant
jurisdictions in all Contracting States, at least where the de-
fendant has its domicile or habitual residence in one of the
Contracting States, and greatly reduce the potential for forum
product liability cases; and that it would not be possible to devise any means of
mitigating the enforcement of such judgments which would not be excessively
difficult to operate in practice." Thus, the Government decided "not to pursue
negotiations on a draft Convention." Hansard, H.L. Debs. 410:1864 (June 26,
1980).
10. Submitted to the Department of Trade and Industry for the UK Advisory
Committee, not in the public domain.
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shopping. Given that the United States has initiated the moves
towards a Hague Judgments Convention, it is strongly hoped
that the United States will become a contracting party to the
Convention. Therefore, UK companies see a real prospect of
being protected from what they perceive to be exorbitant bases
of jurisdiction being used by at least some U.S. state courts.
Another factor which has changed since the 1970s is that
industry in the UK has become much more used to the idea of
the international regulation of jurisdiction rules through the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions which came into force in the
UK in 1987 and 1992 respectively.1' The move towards a sin-
gle market and free movement of judgments in Europe has
doubtless changed perceptions in British industry. The pro-
gressive liberalisation of the global economy through the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' and the setting up of
the World Trade Organisation all point towards the need to
regulate international jurisdiction and thereby provide a court
network, to match or better the existing arbitration system, on
a global scale.
The UK finds itself at the current time responding to the
opportunity to have negotiations to revise the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions at the same time as it develops its negoti-
ating position at the Hague. Legally the two issues are closely
linked because they involve the detailed scrutiny of what the
rules of international jurisdiction should be, how to resolve
conflicts of jurisdiction when the Convention provides litigants
with a choice of forum, and how to provide simple but fair
rules for recognition and enforcement of judgments. Politically
they are linked because at least some of the Member States of
the European Union (EU) like to enter into international nego-
11. For a comprehensive treatment of these Conventions, including the texts of
the two Conventions, see ALEXANDER E. ANTON & PAUL R. BEAUMONT, CIVIL JU-
RISDICTION IN ScOTLAND: BRUSSELS AND LUGANO CONVENTIONS (2d. ed. 1995).
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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tiations with a common position. 3 Formal common positions
13. Article K5 of the Treaty on European Union provides that "Within inter-
national organisations and at international conferences in which they take part,
member-States shall defend the common positions adopted under the provisions of
this Title." TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, tit. VI, art. I.5, para. 1,
O.J. (C 224) 1, 98 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 737 (1992) [hereinafter TEU].
The relevant title includes judicial co-operation in civil matters. See id. art. K.1(6).
However, a common position can be agreed only by unanimity and therefore any
one Member State can prevent the European Union (EU) from agreeing to a com-
mon position vis-&-vis the negotiations at the Hague. See id. art. Y,4(3). When the
Treaty of Amsterdam enters into force, measures in the field of "judicial co-opera-
tion in civil matters" will cease to be part of the intergovernmental pillar of the
EU concerning Justice and Home Affairs currently in Article K of the TEU. Id.;
see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Oct. 2, 1997, tit.
VI, art. 29, 37 I.L.M. 56, 73-74 (incorporating Treaty of Amsterdam amendments).
That pillar will be reduced to dealing with criminal matters. Instead civil judicial
cooperation comes within the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, [19921 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC
TREATY], as part of an effort to establish progressively "an area of freedom, securi-
ty and justice." Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Oct. 2, 1997, tit. IV, art. 61, 37 I.L.M. 79, 89-90 [hereinafter Amend-
ed EC Treaty] (incorporating Treaty of Amsterdam amendments). The Council's
power to legislate is set out in new Article 65 of the EC Treaty:
Measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having
cross-border implications, to be taken in accordance with Article 67 and
insofar as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market,
shall include:
(a) improving and simplifying.
-the system for cross-border service of judicial and extrajudicial
documents;
-cooperation in the taking of evidence;
-the recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and com-
mercial cases, including decisions in extrajudicial cases;
(b) promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Mem-
ber States concerning the conflict of laws and of jurisdiction;
(c) eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceed-
ings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil
procedure applicable in the Member States.
Id. art. 65.
Article 67 provides for the Council to act by unanimity within the first five
years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam and that the Commis-
sion has a shared right of initiative with the Member States. See id. art. 67(1).
Thereafter, the Commission is given the sole right of initiative and the Council
can take a unanimous decision to apply the co-decision procedure with the Europe-
an Parliament to the measures to be adopted under Article 65. See id. art. 67(2).
It is well established that the competence of the Community to enter into
international commitments can be implied from the express provisions of the Trea-
ty. In particular, "whenever Community law has created for the institutions of the
Community powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a specif-
ic objective, the Community is empowered to enter into the international commit-
ments necessary for attainment of that objective even in the absence of an express
provision to that effect." Opinion 2/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, 1-1787, [19961 2
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of the EU at the Hague Conference on the proposed Hague
Convention may be restricted to a general welcome for the
idea14 and are unlikely to amount to an agreed negotiating
C.M.L.R. 265, 289-90 (1996). For the European Community to have an external
competence in the matters negotiated at the Hague, based on Article 65 of the EC
Treaty, a view will have to be taken that the Convention is "necessary for the
proper functioning of the internal market." Amended EC Treaty, supra, art. 65.
This would be a very bold decision given that the phrase used is the "internal
market" and not the "common market." See id. The operation of the internal mar-
ket, in the context of jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments, is
largely regulated by the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. It can be said, howev-
er, that the free flow of trade within the Community may be damaged by an
inability to bring actions against, or recognise and enforce foreign judgments
against, persons not domiciled in the Community who are trading in it. At first
sight this may seem an unrealistic concern in that the Member States are free to
continue to apply exorbitant rules of jurisdiction against such persons but it may
be that at least some Member States exercise restraint in such situations either
by having no exorbitant rules (e.g., Spain) or by using forum non conveniens (e.g.,
Ireland and UK). In any case the new Article 68 of the EC Treaty will allow the
Council, the Commission or a Member State to request the Court of Justice to
give a ruling on a question of interpretation of this new title in the EC Treaty or
of acts of the institutions of the Community based on the title. See id. art. 68. It
is therefore theoretically possible that if the Community were to put forward a
common position in the Hague negotiations it could be interpreted by the Europe-
an Court of Justice (ECJ) under Article 68 or challenged under what was Article
173 (after the Treaty of Amsterdam enters into force it will be Article 230). See
id.; EC TREATY art. 173. The idea of a common position being agreed on substan-
tive issues is rather fanciful because unanimity will apply in the Council until
long after the Hague Convention is concluded in the year 2000 and it is very
difficult to conceive of a situation where the Council, Commission or a Member
State would want to get a judicial interpretation, or challenge the validity, of a
measure taken vis-&-vis the Hague Convention. The only other possible internal
competence in the EC Treaty which might provide a legal basis for Community
competence in the Hague is Article 235 of the EC Treaty, which after the Treaty
of Amsterdam comes into force will be Article 308 of the EC Treaty. See id. art.
235. This legal basis requires unanimity in the Council and it is clear from Opin-
ion 2/94, cited above, that the ECJ recognises an outer limit to the scope of that
Article. See generally Paul Beaumont, The European Community Cannot Accede to
the European Convention on Human Rights, 1 EDINBURGH L. REV. 235 (1997); see
also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTS § 12.2040A
(1996) (commentary by Beaumont and Moir on Article 235 of the EC Treaty); Alan
Dashwood, The Limits of European Community Powers, 21 EuR. L. REV. 113
(1996). Politically, unanimity in the Council agreeing on Community competence in
the Hague negotiations is totally unforeseeable. Legally, it would be difficult to
argue that accession to the Hague Convention is "necessary" to achieve one of the
Community's objectives and therefore it would seem that Article 235 (308) is not a
competent legal basis.
14. For example, the statement by the expert for France (when it held the
Presidency of the EU) to the Special Commission on General Affairs and Policy of
the Hague Conference in June 1995, referred to in CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, INTER-
NATIONAL JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MAT-
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position on any proposed rule within the Convention. The UK,
and probably several other Member States, would resist an
attempt to fetter their discretion to negotiate the substantive
issues at the Hague. Nonetheless, the overlap between the
personnel revising the Brussels and Lugano Conventions and
those negotiating the Hague Convention mean that some cross-
fertilisation of ideas is inevitable. In this respect, the Hague
Conference is helped by the fact that it has been given observ-
er status at the Brussels/Lugano revision negotiations, some-
thing the UK strongly advocated. It may, therefore, be helpful
to explain how revision of the Brussels/Lugano Conventions
has come to the fore at a time when the Hague has already
embarked on the work on a new worldwide Convention. Con-
spiracy theorists may be concerned that this is an EU attempt
to preempt the work at the Hague by producing a regional
revision which becomes a take it or leave it package on the
world stage. Our examination of the process will reveal that
this was not an EU sponsored revision. There should not be
any real danger of EU Member States insisting that positions
adopted in the Brussels/Lugano framework must be followed in
the Hague. Rather there is a fear amongst some parties to the
Brussels/Lugano negotiations that the European model might
somehow be watered down by too much attention to what is
negotiated in the framework of the Hague. Let us hope that
the two negotiations will help each other to arrive at better
solutions. It would, for example, make a great deal of sense if
the Brussels/Lugano provisions on insurance were reexamined
to ensure that the protective jurisdiction is restricted to con-
sumers even though this is not currently on the agenda for
revision of Brussels/Lugano.
II. REVISION OF THE BRUSSELS AND LUGANO CONVENTIONS:
BACKGROUND TO THE NEGOTIATIONS
A.' Standing Committee of the Lugano Convention 3rd
Session, 2-3 September 1996
Revision of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions did not
figure in the Council Resolution establishing the list of priori-
ties for cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs for
TERS § 24 (Hague Conference on Private Intl Law, Prel. Doc. No. 7, Apr. 1997).
1998]
BROOK. J. INTL L.
the period 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1998, but the General Secre-
tariat of the Council suggested that it should become a priority
item in a note to Steering Group III of 8 January 1997.16 The
Secretariat gave four reasons for suggesting this change of
policy. First, the Austrian and Finnish delegations made spe-
cific proposals for revision during the negotiations of the Con-
vention for the Accession of the Republic of Austria, the Re-
public of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden to the Brussels
Convention. 6 That Convention was signed in Brussels on 29
November 1996' and makes some changes to the Annexed
Protocol but no substantive changes to the Brussels Conven-
tion itself. Thus, the Austrian and Finnish proposals were still
on the table. Second, the German delegation had indicated that
certain provisions of the Brussels Convention could be clarified
or amended (e.g., Articles 5(1) and (3)).1" Perhaps significantly
the German proposal had been put formally at the Third meet-
ing of the Lugano Convention Standing Committee in Septem-
ber 1996 rather than to a meeting of a Council Working Party.
Third, the protection of workers in the framework of the provi-
sion of services should be considered in the Brussels Conven-
tion following the adoption of the Council Directive concerning
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of
services. Fourth, the Third Lugano Convention Standing Com-
mittee, meeting in September 1996, agreed to revise the
Lugano Convention and requested Member States to submit
their proposals for revision to the depositary State (Switzer-
land) by the end of March 1997. Switzerland would assemble
the replies and forward them to all the members of the stand-
ing committee with a view to the 4th Standing Committee
meeting in September 1997 in Lugano holding "an exchange of
views on those proposals." 9 Under Article 4 of Protocol 2 to
the Lugano Convention the Standing Committee has the pow-
er, in the light of an exchange of views at the committee, to
"examine the appropriateness of... a revision of the Conven-
15. See 12644/96 JUSTCIV 100 (Jan. 8, 1997).
16. Convention on the Accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of
Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden, Nov. 29, 1996, 1997 O.J. (C 15) 1.
17. As of October 1997, however, the convention had been ratified by only the
Netherlands.
18. See generally Brussels Convention, supra note 3, arts. 5(1), (3).
19. 12644/96 JUSTCIV 100, at 2 (Jan. 8, 1997).
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tion and make recommendations." 0 Although not stated by
the Council Secretariat as a reason for revising the Brussels
Convention it is noteworthy that the Summary Report of the
meeting of the Lugano Standing Committee in September 1996
records that:
The Standing Committee wished that the appropriateness
of... a revision of both the Brussels and Lugano Conven-
tions might be examined. This revision would be justified on
the one hand by the entering into force of the Convention on
the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the Brussels
Convention and by the joint declaration annexed to this Con-
vention and on the other hand by the necessity, admitted
during the discussions, to ensure as extensive a similarity as
possible between both the Brussels and Lugano Conventions.
The Members of the Standing Committee considered that it
would be desirable to organize, for instance in 1998, a Diplo-
matic Meeting on the revision of both Conventions.21
Given that of the eighteen Contracting States to the
Lugano Convention only three are not currently members of
the EU, i.e., Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, nearly all the
members of the Standing Committee were representatives of
the fifteen Member States of the EU. In addition, the Commis-
sion, Council Secretariat and the Court of Justice are all ob-
servers at the Standing Committee. Thus, it was perfectly
natural for the EU States to suggest that the Brussels Conven-
tion be revised in tandem with the Lugano Convention. Howev-
er, the sensibilities of the Council Secretariat and the Commis-
sion may well have been affected by the fact that EU policy
was being made on the hoof in a non-EU forum.
B. Council Secretariat Note of 8 January 19972
The Council Secretariat, in its note of 8 January 1997, was
trying to create EU policy through the proper channels and
assert the EU's right to play the lead role in the revision of
Brussels and Lugano. This can be seen in the wording of its
proposal to set up an ad hoc working party: "the Secretariat is
20. Lugano Convention, supra note 4, Protocol 2, art. 4(2).
21. Summary Report of the Standing Committee of the Lugano Convention, 3d
Sess., at 3 (Sept. 2-3, 1996) (on-file with author).
22. See 12644196 JTUSTCIV 100 (Jan. 8, 1997).
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proposing to set up an ad hoc working party composed of ex-
perts from the Member States and extended to include experts
from the EFTA Member States which are members of the
Lugano Convention. The Commission would be fully involved
in the discussions."23
The Council Secretariat also suggested that meetings
"would generally be in Brussels, at the premises of the Council
General Secretariat. In specific instances to be determined,
meetings could also be held in one of the Lugano States."2'
This grudging concession to the possibility of a meeting in a
non-EU State was accompanied by an assertion that the meet-
ings in Brussels be chaired by a representative of one of the
EU Member States and that only meetings held in one of the
Lugano States would be chaired by a representative of a non-
EU member. The Council Secretariat suggested that meetings
should be held at regular intervals, for example every three
months, and that each meeting would last three or four days.
Observer status could be accorded to States which had been
invited to accede to the Lugano Convention (currently Poland,
though both the Czech Republic and Hungary are being consid-
ered for accession) and to any States applying for accession to
the EU or European Free Trade Association (EFTA). No men-
tion was made of the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law.
The Council Secretariat asked Member States of the EU to
supply it with "concrete proposals for amendments to the Brus-
sels Convention, if possible by the end of February or begin-
ning of March 1997."' The proposals would then be discussed
at an EU meeting in March 1997 before Member States send
their proposals "for the revision of the Lugano Convention" to
Switzerland.26 Apart from this being a ludicrously short time
frame, given that the request is dated 8 January 1997, it is
also a clear attempt to marginalise the Swiss role to one of
dealing with the revisions of the Lugano Convention. This is
confirmed by the Secretariat's statement that "[t]he first ex-
change of views on the expediency of revising the Lugano Con-
23. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id.
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vention would be in September 1997.27 Hence, the Lugano
Standing Committee meeting was to be confined to peculiarly
Lugano matters and not be the first stage in the negotiations
of the revision of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions togeth-
er. This was not what a number of delegations who went to
Lugano in September 1997 expected. In particular, some of the
Scandinavian countries and the UK had come expecting to
begin work on revising the Brussels Convention in tandem
with the Lugano Convention. The UK sent a four-person dele-
gation" instead of the usual one person at Lugano Standing
Committees. The meeting was scheduled to last for the whole
week, implying substantive discussion on both Brussels and
Lugano, but during the course of the week we were informed
that the meeting would finish on Thursday. It was clear that a
number of other delegations did not want to discuss the Brus-
sels Convention until negotiations moved back to Brussels
within the framework of an EU body. This was never stated
publicly but it was the only tenable reason for finishing the
meeting early and forcing everyone to rearrange their travel
arrangements. Some delegates had to suffer the "hardship" of a
free Friday in Lugano because they could not change their
flights.
The Council Secretariat envisaged that after the Standing
Committee meeting in September 1997 in Lugano, the Council
of the EU would set the revision of the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions as a priority and Coreper would set up the work-
ing party of experts. It is significant that it planned the ad hoc
working group as an EU body. Doubtless Coreper would simply
accept the suggestions of the Governments of Iceland, Norway
and Switzerland as to who their experts should be on the ad
hoc group, but formally the EU is in control. One last sign of
the Council Secretariat's attempt to separate the Brussels and
Lugano revision was the idea that the signature of the revised
Brussels Convention should be done in an EU Member State
and the signing of the Lugano Convention revision in a non-
EU Member State.
27. Id.
28. The delegation was composed of John Watherston and Oliver Parker of
the Lord Chancellor's Department, Laura Dolan of Scottish Courts Administration
and the present author.
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C. Meeting between the Council Presidency (the Netherlands)
and Switzerland of 27 January 199729
The Council Secretariats position was modified slightly
after a meeting between the Council Presidency (the Nether-
lands) and Switzerland on 27 January 1997. The deadline for
submitting comments to Switzerland on the revision of the
Lugano Convention was extended to 15 May 1997. More signif-
icantly perhaps, the proposed "ad hoc working party" is now
referred to as the "joint working party." Switzerland wanted
the September 1998 meeting of the working party to take place
in a non-EU State, possibly in Lugano, and the final diplomatic
conference at which the revised Brussels and Lugano Conven-
tions would be signed to be held in the same place. Switzer-
land also favoured a single person to chair the meetings of the
working party, appointed by mutual consent. Finally, Switzer-
land suggested that representatives of the Hague Conference
on Private International Law should have observer status.
D. Meeting of the Working Party on Extension of the Brussels
Convention of 26-27 May 1997"o
The Working Party on the Extension of the Brussels Con-
vention met in Brussels on 26 and 27 May 1997 and drafted
terms of reference for the revision of the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions in light of the proposals for change which had
been submitted by Member States prior to that date. This did
not take the UK's final proposals into account because they
were not submitted until July 1997."' The general guidelines
agreed by the Working Party were very anodyne:
1. During the negotiations the Working Party considers that
all aspects of revision should respect the basic principles of
the Brussels Convention.
2. The revision exercise should take into account the case-law
of the Court of Justice although the process of revising the
Brussels Convention should not necessarily constitute consoli-
dation of that case-law.
3. Any proposal relating to revision should be examined with
a view to its potential usefulness in the operation of the Con-
29. See 5618/97 JUSTCIV 8 (Feb. 12, 1997).
30. See 8158/197 JUSTCIV 45 (June 12, 1997).
31. See 8157/97 JUSTC1V 44 (July 29, 1997).
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vention.
4. Moreover, preparations should be conducted with a view to
the revision exercise starting in December 1997 or January
1998 and being finalized, if possible, at the end of 1998 or the
beginning of 1999.2
The first guideline begs the question: what are the "basic
principles" of the Brussels Convention? There is no clear an-
swer to that question. Clearly the idea of a double convention
is not in question but any of the rules of jurisdiction are open
to reexamination given that several delegations have ques-
tioned the main connecting factor, domicile of the defendant,
which not only provides the general rule of jurisdiction in Arti-
cle 2 but helps to define the personal scope of the Convention.
Habitual residence is favoured as a connecting factor for natu-
ral persons by Austria, France, Germany, the EU Commission,
Finland, Denmark, Switzerland and Italy." The second guide-
line makes the obvious point that the delegations must take
account of the more than ninety judgments of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) on the interpretation of the Brussels
Convention.' The third point is a favourite of Community
lawyers: the notion of the "effet utile." The problem is that
there is no objective way of assessing the potential usefulness
of a particular proposal. Therefore, the "potential usefulness"
of the guideline has to be seriously questioned. In relation to
the fourth guideline, one has to be a little sceptical of projected
dates for concluding negotiations in the EU. The negotiations
on the proposed Brussels II Convention on Jurisdiction, Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters
began in June 1994 with the hope of having a new Convention
opened for signature by the middle of 1995. 35 As of late 1997,
32. 8158/1197 JUSTCIV 45, Annex (June 12, 1997).
33. See id. This document contains the proposals submitted by delegations
with a view toward the revision of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions which
had been received by the Council Secretariat prior to that date. Belgium and the
UK have an open mind on the proposed change from domicile to habitual resi-
dence and the Netherlands would like to see an autonomous definition of domicile
in the Convention.
34. The cases up to 1994 are noted, with the key parts of the judgments in
full and a brief commentary, and grouped according to the article of the Conven-
tion in issue in Appendix 2 to ANTON & BEAUMONT, supra note 11, at 429-592.
The articles of the Convention are analyzed in the main part of the text, taking
account of the case law, in subject matter order.
35. See Paul Beaumont & Gordon Moir, Brussels Convention II: A New Private
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the draft convention is still being negotiated."
E. Standing Committee of the Lugano Convention, 4th
Session, 15-18 September 1997
1. General Guidelines for the Joint Working Party
It was recognised that these guidelines might be modified
after the meeting of the Standing Committee in Lugano in
September 1997, but it was implied that any such changes
would relate only to matters peculiar to the Lugano Conven-
tion. In fact the Standing Committtee suggested only one
change which does reflect a matter peculiar to the Lugano
Convention. Unlike the Brussels Convention, no reference to
the ECJ is possible in Lugano Convention cases. Protocol 2 to
the Lugano Convention requires national courts to consider the
case law of all national courts in other Contracting States
when interpreting and applying the Lugano Convention. 7
General guideline 2 was amended to read: "The case law of the
European Court of Justice as well as of the national courts
referred to in Article 2 of Protocol 2 have to be taken into ac-
count."" It was accepted in the Standing Committee that the
working party should not be required to consider all judgments
of national courts concerning the Lugano Convention, even
though Article 1 of Protocol 2 requires this, because it would
be impractical. Instead, the Working Party need only consider
those national decisions which are transmitted to the designat-
ed central body, the Registrar of the ECJ, in terms of Article 2
of Protocol 2, i.e., decisions of courts of last instance and "judg-
ments of particular importance which have become final.""
Significantly, this permits the Working Party to take account
of such national decisions whether they concern the Lugano or
International Law Instrument in Family Matters for the European Union or the
European Community?, 20 EUR. L. REV. 268, 269 (1995).
36. For a recent analysis of the draft Convention see the Report of the House
of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Brussels II: The Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matri-
monial Matters, Session 1997-98, 5th Report (HL Paper 19).
37. See Lugano Convention, supra note 4, Protocol 2, art. 1.
38. Summary Report of the Standing Committee of the Lugano Convention,
4th Sess., Sept. 15-18, 1997, at 6 [hereinafter Summary Report of the Fourth
Session] (on file with author).
39. Lugano Convention, supra note 4, Protocol 2, art. 2(1).
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Brussels Convention.
2. List of Priorities for the Revision of the Conventions
More contentious at the 1997 Standing Committee was the
list of priorities for revision of the Brussels and Lugano Con-
ventions which had been drawn up by the Working Party. The
Working Party's list of Articles was as follows:
Articles 2, 52 and 53
Articles 4 and 59
Article 5(1) and (3)
Article 6(1)
Articles 13, 14 and 15
Article 16.1
Article 20(2) and (3)
Articles 21 and 22 (and their relationship with Article 17)
Article 24
Articles 27 and 28
Articles 31 et seq.
Article IV of the Protocol
the collective interests of consumers40
Changes were made to accommodate Switzerland and the
EU Member States, including the UK, who had not submitted
their proposals for reform in time for the Working Party meet-
ing in May 1997. The UK had to repeatedly press for the inclu-
sion of the articles it included in its proposals for reform41
which were not already on the list, i.e., Articles 17, 18, 19 and
38. In the end, all of them were included apart from Article 18
which was subsumed within "[r]eview of the whole text of the
Conventions in regard to the wording and other technical and
linguistic aspects."42 The other items added were as follows:
Article 1
personal territorial scope of application, especially in regard
to Articles 17, 18, 19 and 20
a qualification to Articles 31 et seq. as follows (whereby the
project for an European enforcement order should be taken
into account)
40. 8158/1/97 JUSTCIV 45, Annex (June 12, 1997).
41. See 8157/97 JUSTCIV 44 (July 29, 1997).
42. Summary Report of the Fourth Session, supra note 38, at 6.
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the accession procedure (articles 62 and 63)"
The last point about the accession procedure is peculiar to the
Lugano Convention.
3. Composition of and Procedure for the Joint Working Party
The Summary Report of the Standing Committee records
that there was a:
[Gleneral feeling that in the first meeting of the joint Work-
ing Group an open exchange of views should be possible,
without the delegations being bound to their positions. It was
stressed that any list of articles or issues to be reviewed
should not be regarded as exhaustive and the order of the
articles wouldn't express an order of priorities. It was consid-
ered advisable to approach the future work based on issues
rather than on articles."
The UK Presidency of the Council of the EU will have the
opportunity to shape this more issues based approach at the
first meeting of the joint Working Party in Brussels in January
1998 and then at the next two meetings in April and June
1998. Thereafter, a non-EU Member State will host the Sep-
tember meeting. The Swiss desire for one individual to chair
the meetings was supported and Gustav M6ller of Finland will
be Chairman, with Mrs. Jametti Greiner of Switzerland as
Vice Chairman, and Fausto Pocar of Italy (University of Milan)
as rapporteur. It is noticable that these three people also play
important roles in the negotiations at the Hague on the
worldwide judgments convention.45
43. Id.
44. Id. at 7.
45. Professor Pocar is one of the co-rapporteurs at the Hague Conference on
Private International Law Special Commission on the worldwide judgments conven-
tion (as appointed at the Special Commission in June 1997). Judge Mdller chaired
the initial working group that met at the Hague from 29-31 October 1992 to look
into the U.S. proposal for a Hague Judgments Convention and the special commis-
sions which met in June 1994 and June 1996 (in June 1997 he was the Finnish
delegate at the special commission and he was designated as chairman of the
drafting committee). Mrs. Jametti Greiner has been part of the Swiss delegation at
the special commissions.
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4. Observer Status at the Joint Working Party
This brings us neatly to one of the contentious points at
the Lugano meeting, the question of observer status for repre-
sentatives of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law. A very large majority was in favour of this, but "some
delegations" were against (actually two delegations spoke
against). When one member of the UK delegation suggested
that we might be able to learn something from the ongoing
negotiations at the Hague (e.g., on insurance contracts) this
prompted, to quote the Summary Report, "[an animated ex-
change of views."' Some people took the view that the Brus-
sels Convention is part of European integration and goes deep-
er than anything which will be agreed to at the Hague, so
ideas from the latter should not be brought in to water down
its content. This rather political conception of the Brussels
Convention fails to recognise that experts in private interna-
tional law meeting in the Hague might come up with a new
basis for contract jurisdiction which would be a technical im-
provement on Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention or may
repackage the protective jurisdictions in a simpler and more
intellectually defensible way than the present provisions in
Articles 7 to 15 of the Brussels Convention.47 The Summary
Report could only limply conclude that the work of the Hague
and other bodies "could not be ignored.' 8
The admission of Poland as an observer to the Joint Work-
ing Party was "very strongly supported" but less support was
given to observer status for the Czech Republic and Hunga-
ry.
49
5. Substantive Progress on Reform of the Lugano Convention
a. Article 5(1)
There was "general agreement" that the text of Article 5(1)
in the Brussels Convention on individual employment con-
46. Summary Report of the Fourth Session, supra note 38, at 7.
47. See generally Brussels Convention, supra note 3, arts. 5(1), 7-15.
48. Summary Report of the Fourth Session, supra note 38, at 7.
49. Id. at 5. At the first meeting of the Joint Working Party in Brussels in
January 1998, the Hague Conference on Private International Law and Poland
were present as observers.
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tracts, as inserted by the 1989 Accession Convention, was
preferable to the text in the Lugano Convention of 1988. The
two Conventions diverge where the employee does not habitu-
ally carry out his work in one country. The Lugano Convention
provides that the place of performance is the place of business
through which the employee was engaged. 0 This ground of
jurisdiction can be relied upon by the employer. Taking ac-
count of the decision of the ECJ in Six Constructions Ltd v.
Humbert,5 the negotiators of the 1989 Accession Convention
removed the possibility of the employer invoking this ground of
jurisdiction. Where the employee does not habitually carry out
his or her work in one country the employee, and him or her
only, can invoke the jurisdiction of the courts for the place
where the business which engaged the employee was or is now
situated.
It is worth noting that the situation where the employee
does not habitually carry out his work in one country will arise
relatively rarely given the broad construction given to that
concept by the ECJ in Rutten v. Cross Medical Ltd.52 The fact
that the employee worked for almost two-thirds of his time in
one Contracting State and that he had his base there was
sufficient to mean he habitually carried out his work there.
The definition given by the Court was that: "the place where
the employee has established the effective centre of his work-
ing activities and where, or from which, he in fact performs the
essential part of his duties vis-&-vis his employer."53
The Standing Committee Summary Report records that:
"the opinion was expressed that article 5(1) ought to be re-
viewed with respect to the directive on detached workers."54
The relevant directive is Directive 96/71/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of
services.5 Article 6 of the Directive provides that:
In order to enforce the right to the terms and conditions of
employment guaranteed in Article 3, judicial proceedings may
50. See Lugano Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(1).
51. Case 32/88, 1989 E.C.R. 341.
52. Case C-383/95, 1997 E.C.R. 1-57.
53. Id. at 1-77.
54. Summary Report of the Fourth Session, supra note 38, at 5.
55. Directive 96/7J/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 18) 1.
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be instituted in the Member State in whose territory the
worker is or was posted, without prejudice, where applicable,
to the right, under existing international conventions on
jurisdiction, to institute proceedings in another State. 6
The Directive must be implemented into national law by 16
December 1999 at the latest. For purposes of the Directive,
"'posted worker' means a worker who, for a limited period,
carries out his work in the territory of a Member State other
than the State in which he normally works."57
b. Article 17, Final Paragraph
The Standing Committee favoured the Brussels Conven-
tion provision on prorogation in individual employment con-
tracts as it is more favourable to the employee than the
Lugano Convention provision. The latter only permits proroga-
tion agreements after the dispute has arisen, whereas the
former restricts the employer to such post-dispute agreements
but permits the employee to invoke pre-dispute clauses if they
enable him or her to choose a place other than provided by
Articles 2 and 5(1).
c. Article 16(1)(b)
The Standing Committee had a long discussion on this
topic. The division was classically North-South. The Northern
States preferred the Lugano Convention version which allows a
broader exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the place of
immoveable property for tenancies of immoveable property of
less than six months duration. Under the Lugano Convention
it is sufficient if the tenant is a natural person and if both par-
ties are not domiciled in the place where the property is situat-
ed, whereas under the Brussels Convention the landlord must
also be a natural person and both persons must be domiciled
in the same Contracting State.58 The Southern States, includ-
ing France, are anxious to preserve the exclusive jurisdiction of
the situs because of the large number of holiday tenancies that
56. Id. art. 6.
57. Id. art. 2(1).
58. Compare Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 16(1)(b), with Lugano
Convention, supra note 4, art. 16(1)(b).
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they have. They can do this in relation to the Lugano Conven-
tion by entering a reservation saying they will not recognise or
enforce a decision on a tenancy of immoveable property if the
property concerned is situated in its own State:59 no such res-
ervation is possible for the Brussels Convention. It has to be
acknowledged that the practical difference between the two
provisions is relatively slight. If the tenancy agreement is part
of a broader package comprising a contract for services, such
as that provided by a travel agent, then it falls outside the
scope of Article 16(1) anyway.' The Standing Committee
Summary Report suggests that "perhaps both texts ought to be
revised in order to come to a parallel solution."6'
d. Article 28(2) Lugano
Article 28 of the Lugano Convention permits recognition of
a judgment to be refused in any case provided for in Articles
54B(3) or 57(4)." Article 54B(3) allows EFTA States not to
recognise judgments given in EU States against people domi-
ciled in an EFTA State if the Lugano rules of jurisdiction were
not applied." At the Standing Committee, "a number of dele-
gations expressed the view that this difference between both
Conventions should be put aside, though it was noted that a
final decision only can be taken when the results of the revi-
sion will be known.' The concern underlying this provision
is that courts in Brussels Contracting States might mistakenly
apply the Brussels Convention to cases where the Lugano
Convention should be applied. This concern could be eliminat-
ed if the differences in jurisdiction rules between the two Con-
ventions are removed by the revision of the two conventions
but might increase if they were to diverge further. It seems
highly probable that the differences will diminish or be elimi-
nated and that Art. 54B(3) can be deleted. On the other hand,
the general view was that Article 57(4) should be maintained,
59. In fact only France and Greece have made such a reservation to the
Lugano Convention. However, it seems Poland will follow suit when it becomes a
Contracting State.
60. See Case C-280/90, Hacker v. Euro-Relais GmbH, 1992 E.C.R. 1-1111, I-
1132.
61. Summary Report of the Fourth Session, supra note 38, at 5.
62. See Lugano Convention, supra note 4, art. 28.
63. See id. art. 54B(3).
64. Summary Report of the Fourth Session, supra note 38, at 5.
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"but that it could be advisable to redraft the wording.' This
permits the non-recognition of judgments given under other
conventions, for example maritime conventions, where the
State addressed is not a Contracting party to that convention
and the person against whom recognition is sought is domiciled
in that State. If it is retained in the Lugano Convention then
logically it should be included in the Brussels Convention. It
really makes no sense to require States to recognise judgments
against their own domiciliaries (or people who habitually re-
side there) based on jurisdiction rules contained in conventions
to which the recognising State is not a party.
e. Articles 62 and 63 Lugano
Following a proposal from the Netherlands, the Standing
Committee underlined that the revision of Article 62 should
make clear that in general there was no need for an accession
convention when a new State accedes to the Lugano Conven-
tion. The Dutch proposal also envisages a change to majority
rule for the invitation to accede (though of course a Contract-
ing State will remain free to prevent the application of the
Convention to relations ,between it and the acceding State).
The proposal also codifies a more active role for the sponsoring
State in the accession process.
F. United Kingdom Consultation Paper of April 1997'
In December 1996 the Lord Chancellor's Department and
Scottish Courts Administration commissioned the present
writer to prepare a draft consultation paper on the revision of
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. The draft was submit-
ted at the beginning of April and sent out shortly afterwards
virtually unchanged.67 Responses were requested by 30 May
1997, a regrettably short time scale necessitated by the fact
that the UK submissions had been due in by 15 May. Over
thirty responses were submitted. Those issues on which there
65. Id. at 6.
66. LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT & SCOTISH COURTS ADMINISTRATION,
CONSULTATION PAPER, THE OPERATION OF THE BRUSSELS AND LUGANO CONVEN-
TIONS (1997) [hereinafter UK CONSULTATION PAPER].
67. See id. The present author and his excellent research assistant, Peter
McEleavy, did the research on the paper and wrote it.
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was a broad consensus were put forward in the UK submission
of July 1997.' There are other issues where the response was
mixed (e.g., whether there should be a new jurisdiction for
restitution)" and some where the consensus was against a
particular reform (e.g., the deletion of Article 5(1)). 7"
G. UK Proposals for Reform
Apart from aligning the Brussels and Lugano Conventions,
the UK has relatively few substantive proposals for reform. It
would like to make it explicit that "threatened wrongs" are
included within the scope of Article 5(3) and thereby allow
injunctions to be granted in the place where the plaintiff is
facing the harm in question." It is proposed to consolidate the
decision of the ECJ in Kalfelis v. Schriider72 into a restriction
on the scope of Article 6(1) so that there is at least a real con-
nection between the disputes involving the various defen-
dants." The UK wants to amend Article 17 of the Conven-
68. See 8157/971 JUSTCIV 44 (July 29, 1997).
69. See UK CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 66, at 15-16. This issue has not
been addressed in any of the Government submissions to the revision of the Brus-
sels and Lugano Conventions, but the Commission does at least raise the question
whether "actions for recovery of undue payment" fall within Article 5(3) or Article
5(1) of the Conventions, or are best left to the general ground of jurisdiction in
Article 2. See 8157/97 JUSTCIV 44, at 12 (June 19, 1997); see also Brussels Con-
vention, supra note 3, arts. 2, 5(1), (3); Lugano Convention, supra note 4, arts. 2,
5(1), (3). On October 30, 1997, by a majority of three to two, the House of Lords
decided that a claim for restitution of moneys paid under a contract void ab initio
did not fall within the scope of either the contract (Article 5(1)) or tort (Article
5(3)) special jurisdictions and that therefore the only valid jurisdiction was that of
the domicile of the defendant under Art. 2. See Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Glasgow
City Council, [1997] W.L.R. 923 (Eng. H.L.). Thus, the Scottish rather than the
English courts had jurisdiction. See id.
70. See UK CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 66, at 10-13. Deletion is promot-
ed by Finland, France, and the Netherlands, but is actively opposed by Belgium as
well as the UK. See 8157/97 JUSTCIV 44, at 10-11 (June 19, 1997).
71. See UK CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 66, at 19. Similar suggestions
have been made by Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. The Netherlands
has stated that the issue should be clarified. See 8157/97 JUSTCIV 44, at 12-13
(June. 19, 1997).
72. Case 189/87, 1988 E.C.R. 5565.
73. See UK CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 66, at 20. The present text of
Article 6(1) permits a person domiciled in a Contracting State to be sued "where
he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of
them is domiciled." Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 6(1); Lugano Conven-
tion, supra note 4, art. 6(1). The idea that the present wording creates too wide a
jurisdiction is supported by Belgium and the Netherlands. See 8157/97 JUSTCIV
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tions to make it explicit that parties can agree on a non-exclu-
sive choice of jurisdiction in a contract, whereby the courts of
the chosen country have jurisdiction but not to the exclusion of
the courts that can exercise jurisdiction under the general
ground of jurisdiction in Article 2 and any relevant special
grounds of jurisdiction in Articles 5 and 6.' An~other example
of consolidating the ECJ's case law into the text is the proposal
to remove the word "solely" from Article 18 of the Convention
in response to Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain.7 The UK is sug-
gesting a minor amendment to Article 38 of the Convention
concerned with the enforcement of foreign judgments. The
court hearing the second appeal against a decision authorising
enforcement of a foreign judgment should be able to grant or
re-impose a stay of execution pending the outcome of the ap-
peal.76 The most significant UK proposals are now discussed
in a little more detail.
A large number of Contracting States77 recognise that the
present wording of Article 21 of the Convention is unsatisfacto-
ry in not determining when a court is seised of an action. Arti-
cle 21 is a strict lis pendens rule which means the court first
seised has jurisdiction.78 The ECJ has left it to each State to
determine when their courts are seised79 and this has created
divergence as to the critical event, for example bringing the
case to the court or serving the defendant, and even uncertain-
44, at 13 (June 19, 1997).
74. See UK CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 66, at 24. The UK also wants
to delete the penultimate paragraph of Article 17, which has the curious effect of
giving an advantage to the stronger party in contractual negotiations by giving
him or her the power to insist on the weaker party being bound by an exclusive
jurisdiction clause while the stronger party is free to utilise any of the other
grounds of jurisdiction available under the Convention. See id. at 25.
75. Case 150/80, 1981 E.C.R. 1671; see also UK CONSULTATION PAPER, supra
note 66, at 26.
76. This would have the effect of reversing the ECJ's decision in Case C-
432/93, SISRO v. Ampersand Software BV, 1995 E.C.R. 1-2269. See UK CONSULTA-
TION PAPER, supra note 66, at 43. Related questions have been referred to the
ECJ by the Court of Session. See Re Petition of Marie Brizard et Roger Interna-
tional SJ.A, [19971 Intl Litig. Proc. 373 (Scot. Sess. 1996).
77. These inlcude Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK. See also the submissions of
the Commission in 8157/97 JUSTCIV 44 (June 19 1997).
78. See Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 21; Lugano Convention, supra
note 4, art. 21.
79. See Case 129/83, Zelger v. Salinitri, 1984 E.C.R. 2397, 2409.
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ty as to what the rule is in some States. ° The UK wants the
Convention to determine when a court is seised of an action
but does not have a firm proposal as to what the date should
be. The Commission and Belgium have put forward the idea
that a court should be seised only when the case has been
brought before the court (for example by inclusion on the list)
and the notice of the institution of the proceedings has been
served. A cumulative test is also supported by members of the
Commercial Court in England and has recently been advocated
by Mr. Justice Rix. 1 The UK is also advocating another re-
form to Article 21. It wants to enable a court second seised not
to decline jurisdiction in favour of the court first seised if the
parties have given exclusive jurisdiction to the court second
seised within the terms of Article 17. This is the position cur-
rently taken by the courts in the UI02 but it would not neces-
sarily be supported by the ECJ.s
The UK has two proposals in relation to Article 22. This is
the provision that applies to related actions pending in more
than one jurisdiction. It does not apply where the cause of
action and the parties are the same (that is, governed by the
strict lis pendens rule in Article 21) but otherwise it gives
discretion to the court second seised to decline to exercise juris-
diction. The first UK proposal has also been advocated by some
other participants in the negotiations for the revision of the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions." The suggestion is that
the current requirement that the actions are "pending at first
instance" be removed. This has proved to be a significant limi-
80. See, e.g., Grupo Torras v. A1-Sabah, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 7 (Eng. CA.
1995); see also UK CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 66, at 27-29.
81. Sir Bernard Rix spoke at the British Institute of International and Com-
parative Law on 14 October 1997 at a workshop entitled "Jurisdiction in Trans-
national Litigation: Issues Emerging in the Renegotiation of the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions." He advocated a cumulative rule based on issue and postal
notice (or personal service or appearance if earlier).
82. See Continental Bank v. Aeakos S., [19941 1 W.L.R. 588 (Eng. CA
1993); Toepfer International G.m.b.H. v. Molino Boschi SRL, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
510, 514 (Q.B. 1996); Bank of Scotland v. SA Banque Nationale de Paris, 1996
S.L.T. 103, 126-27 (Outer House 1995).
83. The point was not determined in Case C-351/89, Overseas Union Ins. v.
New Hampshire Ins. Co., 1991 E.C.R. 1-3317, although the possibility of the exclu-
sive jurisdictions in Article 16 taking priority over Article 21 was left open. See
UK CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 66, at 30-31.
84. The Commission, Finland and Germany. See 8157/97 JUSTCIV 44 (June
19 1997).
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tation on the applicability of Article 22 which seems to have no
clear rationale.' The second proposal of the UK is designed to
greatly increase the flexibility of Article 22 by permitting the
court first seised, as well as the court second seised, to decline
to exercise jurisdiction in favour of the other court. In other
words, in the absence of the strict lis pendens rule being appli-
cable, a type of forum non conveniens test should apply where-
by appropriateness rather than priority in time is the key
factor. It may be that the combination of a narrowly defined lis
pendens rule and a widely defined related actions rule mod-
elled on forum non conveniens might prove a negotiable com-
promise in the Hague even if it cannot be achieved in the
Brussels and Lugano revision where the UK has to persuade
all the other Contracting States to change the existing Conven-
tions given the need for unanimity.
In relation to Article 24 on provisional and protective mea-
sures the UK has one modest proposal, to prohibit orders for
interim payment under Article 24 unless the court has jurisdic-
tion over the substance of the case. 6
The UK is anxious to protect the autonomy of parties to
choose to refer their case to arbitration or to determine that
the case be heard by the courts of one particular jurisdiction.
In order to achieve this policy objective it is proposing amend-
ments to Articles 19 and 27 of the Brussels and Lugano Con-
ventions. The former is the provision which requires courts to
assess by their own motion whether they have jurisdiction.'7
At present it is only applicable if the court is dealing with a
claim which is "principally concerned with a matter over which
the courts of another Contracting State have exclusive jurisdic-
tion by virtue of Article 16." 8 The UK wants to add "Article
17" after "Article 16" in order to protect exclusive jurisdiction
85. See William Grant & Sons International v. Marie Brizard et Roger Int'l
SA, 1996 S.C.L.R. 987 (Scot. Sess. 1996); Bank of Scotland, 1996 S.L.T. at 131-32.
86. See UK CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 66, at 32-35 (presenting a vari-
ety of possible changes to Article 24). The one mentioned in the text was the only
one that commanded a broad consensus in responses to the consultation paper.
The UK proposal may be affected by the decision of the ECJ in Case C-391/95,
Van Uden v. Kg Deco-Line, which is expected soon. Advocate General Ldger gave
his opinion on 10 June 1997.
87. See Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 19; Lugano Convention, supra
note 4, art. 19.
88. Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 19; Lugano Convention, supra note
4, art. 19.
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clauses and to add that a court should not exercise jurisdiction
in breach of an arbitration clause. The freedom of the parties
to agree to change their minds would be respected by the fact
that the court could continue to exercise jurisdiction if the
defendant had submitted to its jurisdiction. Arbitration is out-
side of the scope of the Conventions and the ECJ has made it
clear that the Brussels/Lugano rules of jurisdiction do not
apply,89 but a specific reference to this in Article 19 would
provide an insurance policy against national courts ignoring
the ECJ's ruling. The UK also wants to build in protection for
arbitration and exclusive jurisdiction clauses at the recognition
stage by an amendment to Article 27 of the Conventions, per-
mitting the non-recognition of a judgment given in another
Contracting State if it is in defiance of an arbitration clause or
an exclusive jurisdiction clause unless the defendant had sub-
mitted to the jurisdiction of the court giving the judgment."°
The UK's stance on the priority of choice of court clauses and
arbitration clauses will be repeated at the Hague negotiations.
The final important amendment proposed by the UK Gov-
ernment is one that will be warmly welcomed outside of Eu-
rope. Article 27 should be amended so that judgments against
parties not domiciled in a Contracting State which are based
on exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction, i.e., grounds not applica-
ble to persons domiciled in a Contracting State, should not be
recognised in other Contracting States. The exporting of exor-
bitant grounds of jurisdiction throughout the EU has long been
regarded as unprincipled9' and the UK opposed it, along with
89. See Case C-190/89, Marc Rich and Co. AG v. Societh Italiana Impianti PA,
1991 E.C.R. 1-3855, 1-3900-01.
90. The extent to which a recognising court is bound to recognise a judgment
given in another Contracting State in defiance of an arbitration clause is a contro-
versial question with significant recent case law in England. See UK CONSULTA-
TION PAPER, supra note 66, at 36-37; see also The "Heidberg", [1994] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 287 (Q.B. 1993); Philip Alexander Securities and Futures v. Bamberger,
[1997] Int'l Litig. Proc. 73, 94-102, 115 (Q.B. 1996). Related questions about the
scope of the application of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions to cases where
there is an arbitration agreement are considered in The "Lake Avery", [1997] 1
Lloyd's Rep 540 (Q.B. 1996), and Toepfer International G.m.b.H. v. Molino Boschi
SRL, [19961 1 Lloyd's Rep. 510 (Q.B. 1996). Further light should be shed on the
relationship between arbitration agreements and the Brussels Convention in Case
C-391195, Van Uden v. Kg Deco-Line, which is still pending. The fact that submis-
sion is given a higher priority than the original jurisdiction or arbitration agree-
ment reflects the UKJs commitment to party autonomy.
91. See, e.g., Kurt H. Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties
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the United States at the Hague Conference, when it was not a
Member State of the EU.92 The original six Member States
responded to the criticism by introducing Article 59 into the
Brussels Convention. This permits Contracting States to
enter into a bilateral Treaty with a third country promising
not to recognise and enforce any judgments from other Con-
tracting States, against persons domiciled or habitually resi-
dent in the third country, which are based on exorbitant
grounds of jurisdiction.' The UK was perhaps mollified by
this change and hoped it could solve the problem by negotiat-
ing a series of bilateral conventions. It made no effort to ex-
clude recognition of judgments based on exorbitant grounds of
jurisdiction during its original Accession negotiations to the
Brussels Convention in the 1970s.95 Inexplicably it actually
agreed to a tightening up of Article 59 so that certain property
based grounds of jurisdiction could not be treated as exorbi-
tant.96 The UK has not been successful in negotiating bilater-
al conventions within the terms of Article 59 of the Brussels
Convention with the notable exceptions of Australia and Cana-
da." The failure of the negotiations with the United States at
on Recognition of Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 995
(1967); Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Outer World and the Common Market Experts'
Draft of a Convention on Recognition of Judgments, 5 COMMON MET. L. REV. 409
(1967-68); Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Common Market Judgments Convention and a
Hague Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1282
(1969). The present writer would go further and abandon exorbitant rules of juris-
diction regardless of where the defendant is domiciled. See ANTON & BEAUMONT,
supra note 11, at 21.
92. See ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE DU 13-16 AVRIL
1966, at 333-431 (Hague Conference on Private Intl Law, 1966); see also Karl
Newman, The 1968 Brussels Convention and Subsequent Developments, in THE
OPTION OF LITIGATING IN EUROPE 1, 4 (Carey-Miller & Beaumont eds., 1993); L. I.
De Winter, Excessive Jurisdiction in Private International Law, 17 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 706, 711 (1968).
93. See generally Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 59.
94. See id.
95. See Newman, supra note 92, at 4-5. Karl Newman was the lead UK nego-
tiator in the negotiations on the accession of the UK to the Brussels Convention
and therefore his comment is significant and rather chilling in its narrow national
self interest: "In the accession negotiations, with the prospect of soon changing
from being a victim to becoming a beneficiary of the existing state of affairs, the
United Kingdom did not resume its attack on this feature of the Brussels Con-
vention." Id.
96. See ANTON & BEAUMONT, supra note 11, at 70.
97. See Convention Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland and Canada Providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement
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the end of the 1970s was a particularly serious blow." Cyni-
cally, it might be suggested that the UK did not want to give
up its leverage in those bilateral negotiations with the United
States in the 1970s by trying in the accession negotiations to
remove the requirement to recognise judgments against U.S.
domiciliaries based on exorbitant rules of jurisdiction. It is
pleasing that in the 1990s the UKs negotiating position in the
Brussels/Lugano revision cannot be accused of cynicism. The
UK is willing to remove one of the incentives for the U.S. to
agree to a new Convention at the Hague by arguing for the
removal of the recognition of judgments based on exorbitant
grounds of jurisdiction in the Brussels and Lugano Conven-
tions. Of course, the ultimate cynic will argue that the UK can
afford to look virtuous knowing that it is unlikely that all the
other Contracting States will agree to the UKs proposed
amendment of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions.
It is too early to attempt to try to assess the prospects for
reform.
III. UK APPROACH TO THE PROPOSED HAGUE WORLDWIDE
JUDGMENTS CONVENTION
The UK has not yet adopted firm views on the proposed
worldwide judgments convention. It has set up an advisory
committee and received a few comments from industry. It has
not yet conducted a consultation exercise but will do so. It is
committed to the idea of its negotiators acting in good faith to
try to produce a workable draft convention while in no way
binding the UK, While the "Smith" rules99 are still in opera-
tion in the special commission, the UK will float ideas and re-
spond to the proposals of others without adopting definitive
positions. Therefore Hague watchers must not assume that the
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Apr. 24, 1984, 1988 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 74 (Cmd. 519); Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Australia Providing for
the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Aug. 23, 1990, 1995 Gr. Bkt. T.S. No. 45 (Cmd. 2896).
98. See supra note 9.
99. Named after the Canadian Chairman of the June 1997 Special Commis-
sion, Mr. T.B. Smith QC, who was insistent that delegations could make proposals
and statements in the negotiations without being bound by them at the early
stages of the negotiations. This will last at least until some way through the
March 1998 Special Commission.
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UK is necessarily committed even to the proposals it put for-
ward, alone or in combination with others, as working docu-
ments at the Hague Special Commission in June 1997. In this
regard, it is interesting to note that Working Document No.15,
put forward by the United States, Finland and the UK, sup-
ports habitual residence as the general ground of jurisdiction
for natural persons, whereas the UK negotiating position in
the Brussels/Lugano Convention revision, arrived at after con-
sultation, is not proposing a change from domicile to habitual
residence.0 0 Of course the UK has a strong interest in trying
to have the same general rule in the Hague Convention and
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. Otherwise, awkward
situations could arise where a person is domiciled in the UK
for the purpose of the Brussels Convention but habitually resi-
dent in the United States for the purpose of the Hague Con-
vention. The overlapping of the scope of the Conventions is
best avoided by having the same general rule of jurisdiction.
The rule should either be a clearly defined domicile rule, like
that contained in the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act
1982,101 or the now familiar undefined Hague Conference
norm of habitual residence.0 2 Curiously enough the former
100. See 8157/97 JUSTCIV 44 (June 19 1997).
101. See Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982, ch. 27, § 41 (Eng.); see
also ANTON & BEAUMONT, supra note 11, at 80-84. For allocating a person domi-
ciled in the UK to the courts of a particular part of the UK "three months" resi-
dence in that part is sufficient. See Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982,
ch. 27, § 41(5)(b) (Eng.).
102. Dr. Clive has recently argued that habitual residence should be left unde-
fined at the Hague and should not be given a technical meaning by the legisla-
tures or courts of Member States. See E. M. Clive, The Concept of Habitual Resi-
dence, 1997 JtJRD. REV. 137. There is a great deal of merit in this view but it
does run the risk that there will be considerable divergence from state to state as
to what constitutes habitual residence. It is notable that where a person's resi-
dence has lasted for less than a year there are conflicting authorities on whether
this constitutes "habitual residence." See id. at 141-42. Some of the many cases in
the UK are as follows: Singh v. Singh, 1997 Green's Weekly Digest 20-930 (three
and one half months not enough); Cameron v. Cameron, 1996 Sess. Cas. 17 (Scot.
Sess. 1995) (four months was enough); Findlay v. Findlay (No.2), 1995 S.L.T. 492
(Outer House 1994) (four to five months not enough); Re B (Child Abduction: Ha-
bitual Residence), [1994] 2 Fain. 915 (two months not enough); Re R (Wardship:
Child Abduction), [1993] 1 Fain. 249 (eleven months was not enough); Re N (Child
Abduction: Habitual Residence) [1993] 2 Faro. 124 (three months not enough); In
re B (Minors) (Abduction) (no.2), [1993] 1 Farn. 993 (seven months was enough to
consitute habitual residence); A v. A (Child Abduction), [1993] 2 Farn. 225 (eight
months was enough); In re F (A Minor) (Child Abduction), [1992] 1 Fain. 548 (one
month was enough); V v. B (A Minor) (Abduction), [1991] 1 Fain. 266 (two months
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may produce more certainty than the latter."3 One issue
which should be dealt with is what happens in the period
when an individual has left his domicile or habitual residence
before acquiring a new domicile or habitual residence. Al-
though Working Document No.23, an anglo-American partner-
ship, advocates an exclusive ground of jurisdiction for trusts it
may well be that upon mature reflection the UK will prefer a
non-exclusive ground of jurisdiction for trusts.
There are some fuindamentals where the UK position is
not likely to change. The support for the principle of party
autonomy is seen in the UK's desire in the Brussels/Lugano
revision to give priority to exclusive jurisdiction clauses and
arbitration agreements over any other ground of jurisdiction
(apart from submission which is itself a feature of party auton-
was enough). What makes the difference in these cases is usually the "intent"
element. The "habitual" quality of "residence" cannot be ascertained entirely objec-
tively and has an element of subjectivity.
103. The statutory definition may help to resolve the difficult and frequent
cases where an individual's residence in a country has been for less than a year.
The Finnish proposal to the Brussels/Lugano revision is for domicile to be replaced
with habitual residence as the general ground of jurisdiction and that residence of
one year would create a presumption of habitual residence. See 8157/97 JUSTCIV
44, at 8 (June 19 1997). However, such a presumption is unnecessary as it is non-
controversial. From a commercial point of view, a simple rule of three months
residence would be attractive. The Hague would be reluctant to have such an
"arbitrary" rule in family law matters and therefore might resist any attempt to
define habitual residence in that way for the proposed worldwide judgments con-
vention. On the other hand the UK statutory domicile created for the Brussels
and Lugano Conventions is so far removed from the traditional concept of domicile
applied in family and succession that it can be used as a convenient label to cre-
ate a simple residence based jurisdiction which is more than presence but less
than some concepts of habitual residence. The subjective intent of the person is
irrelevant. The objective conduct of the person concerned may be looked at to see
if he or she is actually resident in a particular jurisdiction. It is a little worrying
to see the English Court of Appeal interpreting the residence requirement in the
UK statutory domicile as being "[a] settled or usual place of abode" which con-
notes "some degree of permanence or continuity." Bank of Dubai Ltd. v. Abbas,
[1997] Intl Litig. Proc. 308, 311-12 (Eng. C.A. 1996). The notion of "settled" and
"permanence" signify longer term connections with a jurisdiction than seem neces-
sary to establish "domicile" as defined in the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act
(1982 Act). One other small concern about habitual residence in this context is
that the UK courts have been inclined to say that a person cannot have more
than one habitual residence at the same time. See Cameron v. Cameron, 1996
Sess. Cas. 17 (Scot. Sess. 1995); Re V (Abduction: Habitual Residence), [1995] 2
Fam. 992; Dickson v. Dickson, 1990 S.C.L.R. 692, 703. This results in an inconsis-
tency because it has been accepted that a person can have a statutory domicile
within the meaning of the 1982 Act in more than one place at the same time. See
Daniel v. Foster, 1989 S.C.L.R. 378.
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omy) and over the normal lis pendens rule and to allow the
parties to choose a non-exclusive forum. In the Hague negotia-
tions the same commitments are likely to shine through.'
This commitment to party autonomy will of course be tempered
by the need to create protective jurisdictions for certain catego-
ries of litigants. The UK will certainly want to see consumers
protected but will look sceptically at protecting the holders of
insurance policies unless they are consumers, i.e., natural
persons acting outwith the scope of their trade or profession.
The UK will consider carefully the need for and the scope of a
protective jurisdiction for employees. The UK is likely to op-
pose the inclusion of maintenance within the scope of the Con-
vention. The scope of and necessity for any exclusive grounds
of jurisdiction, for example, over rights in rem in immovable
property, will be examined. The hierarchy of rules will have to
be clarified, e.g., will it be possible for a protectivejurisdiction
to be overriden by submission. Here, the clash between the
principle of protecting a weaker party and the need to respect
party autonomy is sharply focused. There is a good case for
saying that after a dispute has arisen even a protected party
should be free to choose an alternative jurisdiction expressly
(choice of court clause) but it is slightly more difficult to argue
that they should be deemed to have accepted it tacitly by not
contesting the jurisdiction of the court chosen by the stronger
party (submission). The relationship between the scope of the
Hague Convention and that of the international agreements on
arbitration is an important issue. An example of the problem is
the question of whether the jurisdiction of the courts to grant a
declaration that a defendant is entitled and obliged to arbitrate
a particular dispute should fall within the scope of the Hague
Convention. Another problem is whether the Hague Conven-
tion will permit the non-recognition of a judgment from a Con-
tracting State on the grounds that it was given in violation of a
valid arbitration clause.
It is clear that not all disputes can be dealt with within
the framework of party autonomy or protective jurisdiction
104. A preview of this can be seen in the .ITs brief Working Document No.17
at the June 1997 Special Commission which wants to cater for non-exclusive juris-
diction clauses and wants the "formal requirements for the validity" of choice of
court clauses to be as "liberal as possible." The UK states that the objective is to
give effect to the "intentions of the parties."
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rules. Therefore it will be necessary to agree on a general
ground of jurisdiction whether it is domicile or habitual resi-
dence.0° It is also clear that whatever general ground of ju-
risdiction is chosen it will not be acceptable as the sole ground.
A number of alternative special grounds of jurisdiction will
have to be agreed upon, for example on salvage.' It is high-
ly likely that the UK will support special jurisdictions for both
contract and tort. The consultation exercise on the revision of
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions shows that there is not
widespread dissatisfaction in the UK with the contract and
tort grounds of jurisdiction in those Conventions and certainly
no clear consensus as to how they could be improved. One of
the risks associated with the Hague Convention negotiations is
that an attempt will be made to draft entirely new contract
and tort grounds of jurisdiction. The meaning of these new
clauses may be uncertain and in the absence of a court like the
ECJ which can impose a uniform interpretation there is a
great risk of diverse interpretations in different Contracting
States. The lack of a court providing a uniform interpretation
of the Hague worldwide judgments convention is a serious
concern for some people in the UK particularly if the Conven-
tion ends up being a double convention or a mixed convention
with a large number of white list grounds of jurisdiction. The
Lugano Convention works because it is almost identical to the
Brussels Convention and benefits from the ECJ's uniform
interpretation of the latter. A particular concern about the
mixed convention solution is the risk that new grounds of ju-
risdiction will be developed in the grey area which are just as
exorbitant as those in the black list, but in the absence of a
role for a court beyond the state concerned will not be prohibit-
ed. The lack of an overarching body to interpret the Conven-
tion and to police its fair application in different Contracting
States makes some people in the UK nervous about the Con-
vention being open to all States in the world. To combat this, a
105. See discussion supra notes 101-03. At the moment "habitual residence"
seems to be a very strong favourite at the Hague. See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE INT'L LAw, PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMIS-
SION CONCERNING THE PROPOSED CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION
AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS 5 (Info. Doc., Sept.
1997).
106. See Working Document No.26 (put forward by the UK and the Nether-
lands at the June 1997 Special Commission).
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suggestion has been made that, in relation to non-Member
States of the Hague Conference, their accession to the Conven-
tion would not take effect in relation to a Contracting State
unless it declares its acceptance of the accession."7
It still seems to the present writer that two of the largest
obstacles to a successful Hague Convention were the issues
given prominence in the June 1996 Special Commission: re-
solving conflicts of jurisdiction and dealing with what some
Member States regard as excessive damages awards. The UK
has not yet developed a firm negotiating position on how to
resolve these problems. It can act as a bridge between conti-
nental European concerns for certainty on the former issue and
restraint on the latter and U.S. desires to protect flexibility on
the former and liberty to juries on the latter. The UK under-
stands the importance of the jury system, though we have
largely abandoned it in civil cases, and we believe in discretion
in conflicts of jurisdiction but have come to live with the cer-
tainty of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions.
107. This is the solution adopted for the Hague Convention on the Civil As-
pects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, art. 38, S. TREATY Doc. No.
99-11, at 14 (1985), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1501, 1504.
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